

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 05246 01 OF 03 211222Z
ACTION SS-25

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O 211104Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1774

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 5246

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CONSTABLE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US,
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH AZIZ AHMED

1. SINCE OUR CONVERSATION IN TEHRAN, I HAVE BEEN GIVING SOME FURTHER THOUGHT TO YOUR MEETING WITH AZIZ AHMED IN PARIS AND HAVE SOME IDEAS ON WAYS TO APPROACH THE TALKS ON BHUTTO'S ANTI-AMERICAN ALLEGATIONS. I AM CERTAIN THE BUREAU IS PREPARING USEFUL BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR THE MEETING, BUT THOUGHT THAT MY PERSONAL VIEWS ON HOW THE TALKS MAY PROCEED WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

2. AZIZ AHMED IS A FEISTY CURMUDGEON WHO OFTEN COMBINES HIS STRONG INTELLECT WITH A HARD-HEADED ATTITUDE IN NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH HE CAN TURN ON THE CHARM IF HE THINKS IT NECESSARY, HIS NATURAL INCLINATION IS TO BE A HARDLINER AND TRY TO FORCE HIS POINT. THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE HIM IS TO BE FIRM AND TOUGH. IF YOU TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, IT WILL SHOW THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE CHARGES AGAINST US. WE WILL BE ON THE OFFENSIVE AND SHIFT THE BURDEN TO THE GOP FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS.

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3. I CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN THE MEETING BEGINS: ---WE VALUED THE CLOSE AND WARM RELATIONS WE TRADITIONALLY HAD WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

---THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN MOST FORTHCOMING IN EXTENDING ASSISTANCE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S GOVERNMENT SINCE HE FIRST

ASSUMED POWER, AND IT HAS BEEN A CENTRAL TENET OF OUR POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN TO ASSIST THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS NATION IN OVERCOMING THE DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS FACING PAKISTAN IN THE WAKE OF THE 1971 WAR.

---AS A RESULT WE HAVE OBLIGATED AID COMMITMENTS WORTH APPROXIMATELY ONE BILLION DOLLARS AND HAVE SIGNED MILITARY SALES CASES WOTH APPROXIMATELY \$280 MILLION SINCE 1971.

---IN EARLY 1975, WE LIFTED THE ARMS EMBARGO AND HAVE SINCE THEN MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING A RATIONAL AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP.

---PRIOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS AGAINST US, WE HAD EVERY INTENTION TO CONTINUE THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS PROBABLY AWARE THAT IN OUR CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION DOCUMENT WE PROPOSED A NOTIONAL LEVEL OF \$98.2 MILLION AS ECONOMIC AID FOR PAKISTAN FOR FY-1978, A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE OVER THE \$76.8 MILLION FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

---OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN BUILT ON A STRONG FOUNDATION OF GOOD FAITH THAT NEITHER OF US WOULD ACT IN A WAY THAT IS DESTRUCTIVE OF THE OTHER'S INTERESTS. WE HAVE HAD DIFFERENCES, JUST AS THE UNITED STATES HAS DIFFERENCES WITH MANY NATIONS. HOWEVER, WE ASSUME THAT WITH FRIENDS SUCH DIFFERENCES ARE WORKED OUT PRIVATELY AND DISPASSIONATELY.

---WE CONSEQUENTLY WERE PUZZLED AND DEEPLY SHOCKED WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER MADE SUCH BASELESS AND UNACCEPTABLE CHARGES AGAINST US.

---THE GOP SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT UNTIL NOW AND HAVE ACTED WITH RESTRAINT AND CALM CONSIDERING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CHARGES MADE AGAINST US.

---WE WOULD LIKE TO RESUME OUR TRADITIONAL GOOD RELATIONSHIP
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WITH PAKISTAN, BUT AS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE THE GOP MUST AGREE TO STOP THE ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN BEING CARRIED OUT NOT ONLY IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CONTROLLED PRESS, BUT ALSO BY RANKING MEMERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

4. I THINK THAT IN THE INITIAL EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO ASK THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST US. IF HE COMES TO PARIS WITH DIRECTIONS TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH US, OUR INSISTENCE ON EVIDENCE WOULD PERHAPS LEAD HIM TO MAKE ACRIMONIOUS CHARGES WHICH CANNOT HELP THE SITUATION. IF FROM HIS REACTION TO YOUR PRESENTATION IT IS OBVIOUS THEY PLAN TO CONTINUE THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST US, WE COULD ASK FOR SPECIFIC EVIDENCE AT THAT TIME.

5. THE POSITION AZIZ AHMED BRINGS TO PARIS FOR THE TALKS WILL DEPEND FUNDAMENTALLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE USEFULNESS OF THE ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN IN HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION. THIS ASSESSMENT COULD WELL BE INFLUENCED BY LAST MINUTE EVENTS ON THE PAKISTAN POLITICAL SCENE. ALTHOUGH

THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS BHUTTO MAY WISH TO SOFTEN HIS ANTI-AMERICAN LINE, WE CANNOT SAFELY ANTICIPATE WHAT THE PM MAY DECIDE, AND CANNOT THEREFORE CONFIDENTLY PREDICT WHICH LINE THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL FOLLOW IN PARIS. AZIZ AHMED WILL, HOWEVER, BE UNDER DIRECTIONS TO FOLLOW ONE OF THREE STRATEGIES--(1) TO REACH AGREEMENT, (2) TO CONTINUE TO ATTACK US, (3) OR TO EQUIVOCATE. REGARDLESS OF WHICH POSITION HE TAKES, HE WILL BE ACTING ON DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND WILL NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DIGRESS FROM THOSE INSTRUCTIONS. ANY DECISIONS HE MAKES, UNLESS THEY ACCORD COMPLETELY WITH HIS DIRECTIONS, WILL HAVE TO BE AD REFERENDUM TO BHUTTO.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 5246

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CONSTABLE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

6. FIRST POSSIBLE GOP STRATEGY: AS I REPORTED EARLIER, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR ZELLI HAS TOLD ME THAT BHUTTO SAID HE WANTS TO REPAIR HIS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, LET BY-GONES BE BY-GONES, AND HAVE OUR RELATIONSHIP RETURN TO ITS PRE-APRIL 28 STATUS BHUTTO'S COMMENTS TO ZELLI HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS AS WELL. I AM, HOWEVER, CHARY OF COMPLETELY ACCEPTING BHUTTO AT HIS WORD IN THIS CASE. ALTHOUGH HIS COMMENTS TO ZELLI MAY WELL HAVE REFLECTED HIS PLANS, HE MAY ALSO HAVE, IN PART, CHOSEN TO SAY WHAT HE KNEW ZELLI WANTED TO HEAR. ALSO, WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHEN BHUTTO TALKS ABOUT RETURNING THE RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT IT WAS JUST SPECIFICALLY WHAT HE MEANS AND WHETHER HE WOULD EXPECT A QUID PRO QUO. HE HAS, HOWEVER, TOLD ZELLI AND THROUGH HIM THE SHAH, HE WANTS TO RECONCILE WITH US AND

PRESSURES WILL BE ON HIM TO EXPLAIN WHY HE DID NOT IF THE
PARIS TALKS ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL.

7. IF AZIZ AHMED GOES TO PARIS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REACH
AGREEMENT WITH US, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT WE EMBARK ON THE
PROCESS OF REPAIRING OUR ELATIONSHIP WITHOUT LEAVING OPEN THE
POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON JUST WHAT WAS
DECIDED AT PARIS. WE WOULD THEREFORE NEED TO DECIDE WITH THE
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MINISTER HOW WE WILL DEAL WITH THE ISSUE BOTH PUBLICLY AND
PRIVATELY. PRIVATELY, AN ORAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN YOURSELF
AND THE MINISTER THAT THE CAMPAIGN WILL CEASE WHOULD BE
SUFFICIENT, PREVIDED THE MINISTER CAN ATTEST THAT THE UNDER-
STANDING HAS THE PRIME MINISTER'S APPROVAL. I DO NOT THINK IT
WOULD BE USEFUL TO STATE SPECIFICALLY WHAT WE WANT TO SEE AS
PROOF THE CAMPAIGN HAS STOPPED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO COVER ALL
THE WAYS WE CAN BE ATTACKED IF THE PM WANTS TO CONTINUE THE
CAMPAIGN. IT THINK IT BETTER THAT THE GOP BE ON NOTICE THAT WE
WILL DECIDE AFTER SOME TIME, BASED ON OUR READING OF THEO
SITUATION, WHETHER OR NOT THE CAMPAIGN HAS REALLY ENDED.

8. PUBLICLY, THERE HAS TO BE A STATEMENT WHICH WILL PROTECT US
TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE AGAINST BHUTTO'S DISTORTION OF
THE UNDERSTANDING TO HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL BENEFIT. I WOULD
RECOMMEND THAT AFTER THE MEETING, IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED, THAT
THE PRESS BE TOLD THAT THERE HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTANDINGS BE-
TWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS WHICH HAVE, AS A RESULT OF YOUR TALKS, BEEN
CLEARED UP. WE BOTH LOOK FORWARD TO RETURNING OUR RELATIONSHIP
TO THE SOLID BASIS WHICH EXISTED FORMERLY. IF WE ARE ASKED
WHETHER THE GOP HAS APOLOGIZED FOR THE CHARGES IT HAD MADE OR
AGREED THEY WERE BASELESS, I RECOMMEND WE REPLY THAT OUR
POSITION ON THE CHARGES IS WELLKNOWNAND HASBEEN STATED
PUBLICLY. HBLEVER, WE PREFER TO VIEW THE CHARGES AS INCIDENTS OF
THE PAST; THEY ARE NOW A CLOSED BOOK AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO
RECONSTRUCTING OUR CLOSE TIES WITH PAKISTAN.

9. AS I NOTED ABOVE, AZIZ AHMED MAY ASK FOR A RETURN TO "NORMAL
RELATIONS" AND THEN IMMEDIATELY GO ON TO DEFINE SUCH RELATIONS
AS INCLUDING AN A-7 SALE, GREATER U.S. FLEXIBILITY ON REPROCESSING,
INCREASED ECONOMIC
AID, AND VARIOUS OTHER CONCESSIONS ON OUR PART.
EVEN THOUGH BHUTTO HAS TOLD ZELLI HE WANT TO RETURN OUR RELAT-
IONSHIP TO NORMAL, MUCH OF SUBCONTINENTAL POLITICS IS INFLUENCED
BY THE ORIENTAL RUG TRADER SYNDROME--IF YOU THINK YOU HAVE AN
ADVANTAGE, RAISE THE PRICE TO THE INTENDING BUYER. BHUTTO MAY
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WELL SEE HIS ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN AS A VALUABLE BARGAINING CHIP AND DEMAND CERTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM US IN RETURN FOR GIVING IT UP. IF AZIZ AHMED TAKES SUCH A LINE, AND ASKS FOR QUID PRO QUOS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE SAY THAT BEFORE WE CAN DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF WHERE A RENEWED CLOSE RELATIONSHIP MAY TAKE US, WE FIRST MUST ENSURE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IS RIGHT FOR SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AND THAT THE AIR MUST BE CLEARED. ONLY THEN CAN WE TURN TO DISCUSSIONS OF SPECIFIC ISSUES. IF THE IRRITANT IS REMOVED, IF WE SEE THE CAMPAIGN HAS STOPPED AND THAT THE GOP IS SINCERE IN ITS DESIRE TO REESTABLISH AMICABLE TIES WITH US, WE CAN THEN MOVE ON TO USEFUL AND FRUITFUL TALKS ON FUTURE COOPERATION.

10. SECOND POSSIBLE GOP STRATEGY: A SECOND OPTION FOR AZIZ AHMED IS TO STONEWALL. IF BHUTTO DECIDES IT IS IN HIS POLITICAL INTEREST TO CONTINUE THE CAMPAIGN, AZIZ AHMED COULD CLAIM THE CHARGES AGAINST US ARE TRUE. HE WOULD ADD THAT THE PM REGRETTED PUBLICLY STATING THEM BUT SINCE THEY WERE TRUE HE COULD NOT KEEP THEM SECRET FROM THE PEOPLE. IN SUCH A SITUATION, I BELIEVE THE ONLY POSSIBLE POSITION FOR US IS TO REMAIN FIRM WITH THE MINISTER AND TO DEMAND PROOF OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST US. IF AZIZ AHMED MENTIONS SPECIFIC INCIDENTS, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REFUTE THEM IMMEDIATELY ON THE BASIS OF MESSAGES WE HAVE SENT ON THE CHARGES BHUTTO MENTIONED TO AMBASSADOR BYROADE, AND OUR RECENT CABLE (ISLAMABAD 5094) ON POSSIBLE AREAS WHERE WE MAY BE ATTACKED. IF HE USES THE LINE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS USED WITH ME--THEY HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO MAKE THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US--WE SHOULD STRONGLY REFUTE THAT CONTENTION NOTING THAT IF SUCH SERIOUS CHARGES ARE MADE, WE WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THEM SPECIFICALLY.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

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SECRET SECTION 3 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 5246

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CONSTABLE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

11. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, WHETHER OR NOT AZIZ AHMED SUPPLIES EVIDENCE, I BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO REITERATE THAT WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT SO FAR BUT OUR PATIENCE IS RUNNING OUT AND THAT IN THE FACE OF A CONTINUING CAMPAIGN OF VILIFICATION AGAINST US WE MUST REASSESS THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN. IF AZIZ AHMED DOES USE THIS OPTION, BHUTTO FACES THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING TO THE SHAH WHY HE DID NOT ACT AS PROMISED. THE PM COULD CONTEND THAT WE PUT CONDITIONS ON AN AGREEMENT THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT--A CHARGE WE COULD REFUTE--OR THAT HE HAD NEW PROOF OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT--A CHARGE HE COULD NOT PROVE. HE WOULD IN ANY CASE FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO THE SHAH WHY HE CHANGED HIS TUNE.

12. THIRD POSSIBLE GOP STRATEGY: A THIRD POSSIBILITY IS THAT AZIZ AHMED WILL CARRY INSTRUCTIONS TO EQUIVOCATE. BHUTTO MAY DECIDE THAT ANTI-AMERICANISM IS STILL A USEFUL DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVICE AND HE WANTS TO LEAVE HIS OPTIONS OPEN AS TO HOW MUCH YOUNGER TO EMPLOY IT. (WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT HIS PUBLICITY PREPARATIONS FOR THE REFERENDUM INCLUDE A HEAVY DOSE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM.) AT THE SAME TIME, MINDFUL OF HIS RELATIONS WITH US, HE WOULD HAVE THE MINISTER SAY THAT

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BHUTTO WAS UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE FROM HIS PARTY TO MAKE THE ALLEGATIONS, HE WAS PAINED TO DO SO, HE WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH US, BUT THERE WAS SOME BASIS TO THE CHARGES AND HE HAD NO CHOICE. THIS WOULD BE COUPLED WITH A PERSONAL PLEA FROM AZIZ AHMED TO UNDERSTAND THE VERY DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION THE PM IS IN AND A REQUEST THAT THE U.S. NOT DO ANYTHING TO JEOPARDIZE BHUTTO'S POSITION.

13. IF AZIZ AHMED TAKES THIS LINE, I BELIEVE WE MUST RESPOND THAT SUCH A POSITION IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND THAT WE MUST REACT IN A MUCH STRONGER WAY THAN WE HAVE SO FAR IF THE ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED. OUR WILLINGNESS TO BE USED AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL FOOTBALL IN PAKISTAN IS REACHING ITS END AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD SEE IT IN HIS OWN AND HIS NATION'S INTEREST TO STOP THE ATTACKS.

14. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT PREDICT WITH CERTITUDE WHICH WAY THE FOREIGN MINISTER MAY GO, OPTION TWO--THE HARDLINE--SEEMS THE LEAST LIKELY IN VIEW OF BHUTTO'S MESSAGE TO

THE SHAH AND THE FACT THAT IF HE WANTS TO CONTINUE THE ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN OPTION THREE--EQUIVOCATION--OFFERS HIM GREATER FLEXIBILITY. BHUTTO IS A MAN OF SURPRISES, HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY POSSIBILITY IN DEALING WITH HIM. I WOULD ONLY EMPHASIZE THAT IN THE MIDST OF HIS CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS AT HOME HE SEES ALL HIS OPTIONS THROUGH THE PRISM OF HIS POLITICAL SURVIVAL. DOMESTIC POLITICAL UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE OPPOSITION WHICH ARE REACHED ONE DAY CAN BE MODIFIED OR DENIED THE NEXT, IF HE CONSIDERS IT EXPEDIENT TO DO SO. WE MUST GUARD AGAINST ANY SIMILAR TENDENCY HE MAY HAVE IN HIS INTERNATIONAL DEALINGS, SPECIFICALLY ON HOW HE SEES THE FUTURE OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THE BETTER HE UNDERSTANDS THAT WE FIND IT UNACCEPTABLE TO BE A PAWN IN HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL GAME, THE BETTER THE CHANCE TO REESTABLISH THE LONG-TERM MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN THAT WE BELIEVE IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO HAVE.

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15. I REALIZE THERE MAY BE SOME WHO CONTEND THAT WHILE BHUTTO IS PASSING THROUGH A DIFFICULT TIME, WE SHOULD SHOW UNDERSTANDING FOR HIS PLIGHT AND NOT BE FIRM WITH HIM WHEN HE FACES SUCH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AT HOME. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THIS POSITION IS THAT IF THE GOP REALIZES IT CAN WITH IMPUNITY USE US AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL, WE WILL OVER THE LONG TERM FIND OURSELVES ATTACKED BY THE GOVERNMENT WHENEVER AND HOWEVER IT THINKS IT POLITICALLY CONVENIENT. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BUILD AN ENDURING STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN SUCH CONDITIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BHUTTO (AND HIS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS) UNDERSTAND THAT A VIABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH US REQUIRES CERTAIN CONSTANTS--ONE OF WHICH IS ABJURING PUBLIC SCURRILOUS ATTACKS ON THE OTHER.

16. THE MINISTER MAY RAISE SEVERAL OTHER, TANGENTIAL ISSUES, WITH YOU IN PARIS. I WILL BE SENDING SEPTTEL LISTING WHAT SOME OF THESE ISSUES MAY BE AND GIVING OUR VIEWS ON HOW WE CAN APPROACH THEM.
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